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We linked names and contact information to 
publicly available profiles in the Personal Genome 
Project.  These profiles contain medical and genomic 
information, including details about medications, 
procedures and diseases, and demographic 
information, such as date of birth, gender, and postal 
code. By linking demographics to public records such 
as voter lists, and mining for names hidden in 
attached documents, we correctly identified 84 to 97 
percent of the profiles for which we provided names. 
Our ability to learn their names is based on their 
demographics, not their DNA, thereby revisiting an 
old vulnerability that could be easily thwarted with 
minimal loss of research value. So, we propose 
technical remedies for people to learn about their 
demographics to make better decisions. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The freedom to decide with whom to share 
one’s own medical and genomic information seems 
critical to protecting personal privacy in today's data-
rich networked society. Individuals are often in the 
best position to make decisions about sharing 
extensive amounts of personal information for many 
worthy purposes like research. A person can weigh 
harms and benefits as relevant to her own life. In 
comparison, decisions by policy makers and 
committees do not usually allow fine-grained 
personal distinctions, but instead dictate sweeping 
actions that apply the same to everyone. But how 
good are the decisions individuals will make? A 
person may have far less expertise than vetted 
committee members or veteran policy makers. And 
potential harms and vulnerabilities may be hidden; if 
so, an individual may not be able to make good 
decisions. 
For example, sharing information about 
sexual abuse, abortions, or depression medication 
may be liberating for one person yet harmful for 
another.  Further, if the information is shared without 
the explicit appearance of name or address, a person 
may be more likely to share the information publicly 
because of a false belief she is anonymous. 
It is important to help people make good 
data sharing decisions. If people share data widely 
and thousands of people get subsequently harmed 
doing so, policy makers may respond and take away 
the freedom to make personal data sharing decisions, 
thereby depriving society of individual choice. To 
make smarter decisions, people need an 
understanding of actual risks and ways technology 
can help.  
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Launched in 2006, the Personal Genome Project 
(PGP) aims to sequence the genotypic and 
phenotypic information of 100,000 informed 
volunteers and display it publicly online in an 
extensive public database [1]. Information provided 
in the PGP includes DNA information, behavioral 
traits, medial conditions, physical characteristics, and 
environmental factors. A general argument for the 
disclosure of such information is its utility. The PGP 
founders believe this information will aid researchers 
in establishing correlations between certain traits and 
conducting research in personalized medicine. They 
also foresee its use as a tool for individuals to learn 
about their own genetic risk profiles for disease, 
uncover ancestral data, and examine biological 
characteristics [2]. According to the project’s 
principal founder, Harvard geneticist George Church, 
the only real utility of this type of information is as 
data reflecting physical and genomic characteristics 
[3]. Along with Steven Pinker and Esther Dyson, he 
volunteered his information publicly as one of the 
first ten participants in the project. Currently, 2,593 
individuals disclose their information publicly at the 
PGP website. 
The PGP operates under a privacy protocol 
it terms “open consent”[4]. Individual volunteers 
freely choose to disclose as much personal data as 
they want, often including identifying demographic 
data, such as date of birth, gender, and postal code 
(ZIP). Online, the profiles appear in a “de-identified 
state,” being void of the direct appearance of the 
participant’s name or address.  The result provides 
volunteers with seeming anonymity and a participant 
is assigned an identification number as the reference 
to his profile. Participants may upload information 
directly from external DNA sequencing services 
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(e.g., from 23andMe), but these services often 
provide documents having additional personal 
information including the participant name.  
PGP participants are required to sign a range 
of consent forms and pass an entrance exam. The 
consent form does not in any way guarantee 
participants a degree of privacy. To the contrary, the 
form explicitly states that participation may even 
reveal other non-disclosed information about the 
participant:  
“If you have previously made available or 
intend to make available genetic or other medical or 
trait information in a confidential setting, for example 
in another research study, the data that you provide to 
the PGP may be used, on its own or in combination 
with your previously shared data, to identify you as a 
participant in otherwise private and/or confidential 
research.  This means that any data or other 
information you may have shared pursuant to a 
promise of confidentiality or privacy may become 
public despite your intent that they be kept private 
and confidential.  This could result in certain adverse 
effects for you, including ones not considered or 
anticipated by this consent form” [5] 
Risks mentioned by the form include public 
disclosure and identification and the use of personal 
genomic information for non-medical purposes 
including cloning provided cell lines. It is 
emphasized that all risk lies with the individual. 
Once a participant uploads information to 
his online profile, the PGP offers almost no means to 
amend or modify information.  Participants basically 
display all the contents of the profile or none at all 
unless they know how to edit files directly. Some of 
these files use complicated and unusual formats (e.g., 
a continuity of care report that holds the participant’s 
personal health record).  
 
Medical Privacy Regulation: HIPAA 
The Health Information Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) in the United States is 
the federal regulation that dictates sharing of medical 
information beyond the immediate care of the patient, 
prescribing to whom and how physicians, hospitals, 
and insurers may share a patient’s medical 
information broadly. Patients are exempt. A patient 
may share his own information with whomever and 
wherever he chooses, and others have already posted 
detailed medical and genomic information –
abortions, medications, and histories of abuse and 
mental illness – freely and publicly online at the 
PGP. 
For medical data covered under HIPAA to 
be shared publicly beyond the control of the patient, 
dates would only contain the year, and the ZIP code 
would only have the first 2 digits if the population in 
the ZIP code is less than 20,000. No explicit 
identifiers, such as name, Social Security numbers, or 
addresses can appear.1  
In sharp comparison, participants in the PGP 
often share their full date of birth (month, day and 
year) and the full 5 digit ZIP code, regardless of 
where they reside. 
In 1997, Sweeney showed how 
demographics appearing in medical data that did not 
have the names of patients could be linked to 
registries of people (e.g., voter lists) to restore name 
and contact information to the medical data [6]. Her 
earliest example was identifying the medical 
information of William Weld, former governor of 
Massachusetts, using only his date of birth, gender, 
ZIP appearing in the medical data and a voter list [7]. 
Sweeney also used populations reported in the U.S. 
Census to predict that at most 87 percent of the U.S. 
population had unique combinations of date of birth, 
gender, and ZIP [6]. Recently, others have challenged 
whether there really is any vulnerability to being re-
identified by date of birth, gender and ZIP, citing a 
lack of documented examples and being confused 
about whether Weld was re-identified because he was 
targeted or because his demographics were unique 
[8]; begging the question to be revisited. Can people 
be re-identified by date of birth, gender, and 5-digit 
ZIP? 
 
METHODS 
 
The database we used was 1130 public profiles 
copied from the PGP website [1] on September 1, 
2011, which were all the public profiles available at 
the PGP at that time. About half of the profiles, 579 
of 1130 or 51 percent, had date of birth, gender and 
5-digit ZIP. Unless otherwise noted or is obvious 
from context, these 579 profiles comprise the base 
dataset for analysis (“Dataset”). 
 
Experiment: Linking Demographics 
We conducted an experiment to determine 
how many of the profiles in Dataset we could re-
identify by name using public records. Our sources 
for public records was a national sample of voter 
registrations (“Voter Data”) and online access to a 
public records website (“Public Records”).  The voter 
data was purchased from a third-party data broker 
and contained a sample of voter registrations for the 
5-digit ZIP codes listed in Dataset. We estimate the 
sampling fraction in the Voter Data to be 72% based 
on a comparison of totals reported by state officials 
in one state (Massachusetts).  
                                                            
1 45 CFR 164.514(b)(2) (2002). 
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The approach involved matching 
demographics (date of birth, gender, ZIP) appearing 
in the PGP profiles of Dataset to those appearing in 
Voter Data or Public Records, and recording how 
many of the matches yielded just one name.  Figure 1 
shows a graphical depiction of our approach. 
 
 
Figure 1. Linking PGP profile to a voter list using 
demographics to put names to the medical and genomic 
content appearing in the PGP profile. 
 
Experiment: Extracting Embedded Names 
We wrote programs in the Python and Java 
programming languages to download files from the 
publicly accessible PGP website; these were public 
profiles and other downloadable files associated with 
profiles.  Some personal names appeared within 
downloaded documents. Our programs automatically 
extracted demographic information from the profile 
and names appearing in the filenames of compressed 
files that downloaded. From observation, we learned 
that many of the downloadable DNA files associated 
with PGP profiles were compressed, but once the file 
was uncompressed, the resulting file had a filename 
that included the name of the person as part of the 
filename. As a made-up example, the profile 
hx0157A may have a downloadable DNA file named 
hx0157A_8659862.zip, which when uncompressed 
gives the file having the name 
genome_Elaine_Smith_Full_629562.txt.   
 
RESULTS 
 
Numerous tests were conducted on Dataset 
to demonstrate the ability to reliably put names to the 
profiles.  Linking demographics in Dataset to those in 
the Voter Data yielded 130 (130 of 579 or 22 
percent) unique matches.  Our programs for finding 
embedded names located 103 (or 18 percent) names. 
Searches of the demographics from Dataset on a 
public records website yielded 156 (or 27 percent) 
unique matches.  Combining these results gave a list 
of 241 (or 42 percent) unique names matching 
profiles. These were submitted to the PGP staff and 
scored: 84 percent correctly matched, being as high 
as 97 percent if allowing considerations for 
possible nicknames (e.g. Jim instead of James).   
Table 1 describes the contributions of each 
strategy. Embedded names contributed 74 names not 
accounted for by the other strategies, linking to Voter 
Data contributed 44 distinct names and to Public 
Records, 65 names that would not otherwise have 
been known. Embedded names had 12 names in 
common with Voter Data and 17 with Public 
Records. Voter Data and Public Records had 74 
names in common.  
Table 2 reports the correctness of each 
strategy. The embedded names provided the highest 
number wrong (19 or 18 percent), primarily due to 
uses of nicknames. Voter Data matches gave the 
highest number of correct matches, even greater than 
Public Records, primarily because of a temporal 
problem inherent in the experimental design.  
Information stored in the profiles of Dataset was 
entered between 2006 and 2011. The Voter Data 
were as of 2011 but the Public Records were as of 
2013. A critical problem is believed to be the mobility 
of people from one ZIP code to another during those 
years, which causes a temporal mismatch between 
the Public Records and Dataset. 
 
 Name Voter Public Totals 
Name 80 12 17 109 
Voter Data 12 45 74 131 
Public Records 17 74 65 156 
Totals 109 131 156  
Table 1. Discrimination of strategies. Values report the 
number of names specific to the strategy (e.g., embedded 
names contributing 74 names not otherwise found) or in 
common across strategies (e.g., 17 names found in both 
embedded names and Public Records).  
 
 Wrong Total Correct% 
Name 19 103 82% 
Voter Data 9 130 93% 
Public Records 20 156 87% 
Table 2. Correctness of different re-identification 
strategies. Errors in matching embedded names and other 
strategies are due primarily to uses of nicknames rather 
than real names. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
These experiments demonstrate how PGP 
profiles are vulnerable to re-identification.  What’s 
the potential harm?  Many participants reveal more 
than DNA, including seemingly sensitive conditions  
(e.g., profiles hu342A08, hu6D1115, and hu56B3B6) 
–abortions, sexual abuse, illegal drug use, 
alcoholism, clinical depression and more. 
Perhaps more alarming are potential 
economic harms a participant may face. Here is an 
example. Suppose a hypothetical participant named 
Bob has a predisposition to a gene-based disease 
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related to his genetic profile online. He applies for 
life insurance. If Bob is aware of the predisposition 
and discloses the information, he may be denied 
coverage or asked to pay a much higher premium. If 
he does not disclose knowledge of the predisposition 
or if he is not aware of the predisposition, the 
insurance company may fail to pay the claim upon 
his death. While the Genetic Information Non-
Discrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) protects against 
some forms of discrimination (e.g. medical 
insurance), it does not cover all forms (e.g. life 
insurance). 
Given the earlier discussion, we might have 
predicted being able to match unique names to more 
than 42 percent of the profiles. There are several 
possible explanations. The first is the temporal 
mismatch in the data described earlier. The second is 
our working with a sample of the voter data, rather 
than the entire voter file for each 5-digit ZIP. The 
third may be the quality of the data.  And finally, 
Sweeney’s prediction of 87% of the population being 
unique is an upper bound.  
In concluding, what can a participant do to 
protect himself or herself? He can change the values 
in the fields that made this approach successful: date 
of birth or ZIP code. By making these values less 
specific, it becomes harder to link his name to the 
profile. Also, she can remove her name from 
appearing explicitly in documents she uploads. 
To achieve these precautions required 
intervention on our part.  We provide two technical 
services to PGP participants.   
Sweeney constructed a website for a person 
to determine how unique his demographics may be 
(and therefore how easy it is to identify him) from his 
ZIP code, date of birth, and gender.2 Anyone can 
check his or her demographics, even if not a 
participant in the PGP. 
As stated earlier, the PGP itself does not 
support editing of the date of birth field, though 
participants can modify ZIP codes directly. So, we 
built a CCR (Continuity of Care Record) editor3 for a 
participant to change his date of birth to report only 
year of birth or remove it altogether in the CCR file 
he uploads to the PGP. 
Using knowledge from this study and 
associated services, individuals can make better data 
sharing decisions, or at least be more informed of 
risks and society can learn that date of birth, gender 
and 5-digit ZIP codes can be uniquely identifying. 4 
                                                            
2 The identifiability server is at http://aboutmyinfo.org/ 
3 Available at https://mydatacan.hmdc.harvard.edu/pgp/ 
4 Specific advice for PGP participants is available at 
http://dataprivacylab.org/projects/pgp 
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